In noncooperative networks users make control decisions that optimize their own performance measure. Focusing on routing, we devise two methodologies for architecting noncooperative networks, that improve the overall iietwork performance. These methodologies are motivated by problem settings arising in the provisioning and tlie ruii time phases of the network. For either phase, N i d i equilibria characterize the operating point of the network.
INTRODUCTION
Control decisions in large scale networks are often made by each user independently, according to its own intlivitlual performance objectives. Such iietworks are lienceforth called noncooperdive, antl game theory [I] provides the systematic framework t o study aid understand their ljeliavior. Game theoretic models have been employed in the context of flow control [Z, 3, 4, 5, 61, routing [7, 51, antl pricing [8] in modern networking. These studies mainly iiivestigate the structure of the network operating points, i.e., the Nadk equilibria of the respective games. Such equilibria are inherently inefficient and, in general, exhibit suhoptiiiial network performance.
The goal of this paper is to demolistrate that, while users make noncooperative decisions, there is still rooin for improving network perforinance. Iniprovenieuts caii be achieved both during the provisioning pli~se, i.e., wlieii tlie network parameters are sized, ant1 tluriiig the run tiine phase, i.e., during the operation of the iietwork. Focusing
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Haifa 32000, Israel on routing, we give a uniform methodology for achieving such improvements. This methodology is based on architecting the network equilibria. The related analysis involves comparisons among operating points of different games. Such comparisons are scarcely attenipted in the game theoretic literature, mainly due to the complex structure, or lack thereof, of the underlying game. One exception is [9] which addresses the problem of designing the service discipline of a switch shared l y users performing flow control.
In the provisioning phase, the designer allocates link capacities, i.e., architects the ccrpacity configuration of the network, so that the resulting equilibrium is systemwide "efficient" or "optimal." We consider several efficiency criteria for the designer, such as the "price" (marginal cost) as seen by each user, the total cost of each user, or some combination of the above. The designer has to decide how much capacity should be allocated to each link, while satisfying lower bounds specified per link and an upper bound on the total capacity. The designer seeks an allocation of capacities that achieves the best performance, according to the cliosen efficiency criterion. The immediate question that arises is whether the designer should attempt to employ all the available resources. Surprisingly, in general, the answer is no! To illustrate this counterintuitive behavior of noncooperative networks, in [10] we adapt the Braess paradox [Ill to our setting and show that addition of resources may result in a Jegrudotion of nser performance. For a system of pardlel links we show that the Braess paradox cannot occur, that is, additiori of capacity improves the network performance. We then consider the problem of allocating such additiond capacity to links in an optimal way. We show that the best design strategy is t o allot the additional capacity exclusively to the link with the originally highest capacity. This solution coincides with the optimal capacity allocation in a network where routing is centrally controlled. We extend some of these results to general network topologies.
In the I'UIL time plinse, we assume that, apart from the noncooperative users, there is also a manager, that attempts to optimize the system performance, by deciding upon the routing of an additional, network-controlled flow. The manager is aware of tlie noncooperative behavior of the users, antl thus it caii predict their reaction t o any routing strategy that it chooses. This information enables the niaiiager to inipleiiient a roiitiiig strategy that drives the users to the "best" Nasli equilibrium in terms of system performance, architecting, this way, tlie flow configuration of the network. This is the typical scenario of a Stackelberg ganie [l] , in which the manager acts as a leader and imposes its strategy on the users whicli hehave ns followers. For the parallel links model, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee that the niariager can enforce an equilibrium that coincides with tlte global systeniwide optimum. Moreover, we indicate that these conditions are met in many practical c'ases. In other words, the manager is often able to obtain, through limited control, the same systein performance ' a s in tlie case of ceutralized control.
THEMODEL
We consider a set Z = { I , . Let R = E I E I~' denote tlie total througliput deniancl of the users. Throughout this paper, we colisider oiily capacity configurations c = ( c l , . . . , C L ) that C a l i accoinniodate tlie total user demand, i.e., configurations with C > R. The performance objective of user i is quantified by means of a cost,fiiiiction J'(f). The user aiiiis to find a strategy f' E F' that niiniiitizes its cost. This optiniization problem depends on the routing decisioiis of the other users, described by the strirtegy profile f-' = (fl ) . . . , f'-l,f'+', ..., fr), since J' is a function of tlie system flow coufiguratioli f. A Nash equilibrium of the routing game is a strategy profile from which no user finds it Ixneficial to unilaterally deviate.
The problem of existence ancl uniqueness of equilibria of the routing game has been iitvestigated in [5] foi certain general classes of cost functions. In the present paper, we coiisider cost functions that are the suiu of link cost functions:
where f i = (f:, . . . , f : ) , ancI T(fi) is tIir average tielay per unit of flow on link 1 and tlepeiids only oii tlie total flow f i = zrEZ f; on that link. In particular, we concentrate on the M / M / l delay function:
Given a strategy profile f-' of the other users, the cost of user E, as defined by eqs. (2) and (3), is a convex function of its strategy f'. Hence, the minimization proLleIn in (1) 1i.w a unique solution. The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, then, imply that f' is the optinial response of user i t o f-' if and only if theie exists a (Lagrange multiplier) A', such that:
i.e., a strategy profile f E F is a N,asli equilibrium, if and only if there exist A', I E C, such that the optimality conditions (4)-(6) are satisfied for all i E: Z. The above conditions imply that the Lagrange multiplier A' is in fact the niarginal cost of user i at tlie optiinality ,point. IU accordance with the economics terminology, A' will be referred to as the price of user a.
In [5] it has been shown that the routing game described above has a unique N;tsh equilihriuin.
At times we will concentrate on a special type of users, defined in tlie following.
Defiriitioii 2.1 Consistent users; t i~e say that users ure
coirsisteiit (for a gioeit capacity configuration) if, at the Nush equdldbrirrrra, tlrey uif m e the surne set of links.
[5] it is shown that if all users are identical (i.e., r' = T'
for all i and j in Z), theu they are also consistent. Consisteut users are also typical of systenis with heavy traffic, i.e., wlien R gets close to C, in whicli case all users will use all links in the network.
Validity of the Model
We note that systeins of parallel links represent an appropriate niodel for seemingly unrelated networking problems. Consider, for example, a network in which resources are pre-allocated t o various routing paths that do not interfere. Such scenaria are common in modern networking. In 1)roadhand networks bandwidth is separated among different virtual paths, resulting effectively in a system of parallel and non-interfering "links" between source/destination pairs. Another example is that of internetworking, in which each "link" riiodels a different sub-network.
ARCHITECTING THE CAPACITY CONFIGURATION IN THE PROVISIONING PHASE

Problem Formulation
Consider a network of parallel links with initial capacity coiifiguration CO and total capacity C'O > R. We assume,
5.3.1
without loss of generality, that c! 2 . . . 2 COL > 0 Suppose that there exists some additional capacity allowance of at most A, which the network designer can tlistril~ute anioiig the network links. The aim of the designer is to impleiilent a capacity configuration c , with C I 2 cy for all links 1 E C, that results in a network, with a total capacity of at most CO + A, that is "efficient" at the corresponding Nash equilibrium. Without loss of geiierality, we can concentrate on capacity configurations c that preserve the initial link order, i.e., configurations with c1 2 . . . 2 C L . Therefore, the set of all capacity configurations that can be iinpleiiieuted by the designer can be described by:
Each capacity configuration in CA induces a routing garlie that has a unique Nash eqiiilihiiun. Therefore, we can define a function N : CA -+ E r L , that assigiis to each c E CA the Nash equilibrium N ( c ) of its respective routing game. N will be referred to as tlie Nush rrrcrppiirg. The set CA will be called the space of routing gurires.
The designer may have different nierwures to cliaracterize the efficiency of a capacity configuratioii. In this work, we shall concentrate on measures that are expressed by means of either the user prices or costs. We mention that, although the user's cost is a direct measure of its level of satisfaction, prices may be a more iiuportant inerasure from a system's point of view, since they accouiit for the level of congestion as seen by users and are tlie direct indication of how each user could accornniodate fluctuations in the system's state. Tlie designer can consider various ways of coinbining either the prices or the costs of tlie users. We shall consider the following two: userwise optirnization, i.e., trying to reduce the price or cost of each and every user, and total optimization, i.e., trying to reduce the sum of all prices or costs.
The various performance measures of the designer are fornially stated in the following defiiiitions: 
2.
userwise price (correspondingly, cost) optimal, if it is userwise price (correspondingly, cost) efficient relatotully price (correspondingly, cost) optimal, if it is totally price (correspondingly, cost) efficient relative to ony c E C .
titJe to UlZy C E c,
The optimal capacity allocation problem, corresponding to tlie various designer's performance measures, is described as follows:
Given a systein of parallel links C with users I, an (initial) capacity configuration CO and an additioiial capacity allowance A, find a capacity configuration c* that is userwise/totally price/cost optinial with respect t o CA.
As shown in [lo] , the results of the following subsections can lie easily extended to the case where cy = 0 for some links 1 E C, i.e., when tlie designer is also allowed to add a (finite) nuriiber of links to the network.
Main Results
Followiiig is a brief suniniary of the main results on the design problem. UIiless otherwise stated, the results apply t o the model formulated in Section 2.
We say that a capacity configuration E is an augmentatiora of a capacity configuration c if ?I C I for all I and We are particularly interested in augmentatio~is in which capacity is atlded to link 1 solely. The second lemma shows that, for such augnientations, the resulting configuration is totally cost efficient. While the above is a simple and iiituitive result, its proof requires systematic analysis that establishes some "order" in the complex structure of the iiriderlyiiig gatne. Tlie details can be found in [lo] .
The following two propositioiis establisli that the userwise price optimal capacity corifigiiratioii C* is also userwise cost optimal in soiiie special cases of iiiterest. 
General Topologies
The example presented in tlie Iiitroductioii shows tliat atldiiig capacity to a network, even in infinite aiiiouiits, iiiay resnlt in an increase of both the price and cost of each aiid every user. This indicates that an upgrade of a. general iietwork, in terms of capacity and link atlditioii, slioiild he carried out in a cautious way. In [10] we estat)lisli coiiditioiis for the Braess paradox not to occur iii any network toliology. Informally, these results suggest that tlie poteiitial danger of degradation in performance, as nianifested iir tlie Braess paradox, can be avoided by upgrading the network either uniformly or through direct coiinections betweeii source slid destination.
ARCHITECTING THE FLOW CONFIGURATION I N THE RUN TIME PHASE
As explained in tlie Introductiou, iniproveiileiit of tlie systernwide perforniance of a noncooperative network ciiii be perforiiied not only in the provisioning phase, but also duriiig tlie actual operation of the network. In this section we demonstrate tliis approach based on the noncooperative routing model described in Section 2. We assume that, apart from the flow generated by the self-optimizing users, there is also soiiie flow whose routing is controlled by a central network entity, that will be referred t o as the "manager." Typical examples of such flows are the traffic generated by signaling and/or control mechanisms, as well as traffic of users that belong to virtual networks. The manager 1i.a the following goals and capabilities: (i) it aims at optimizing tlie systern performance, i.e., the average delay of all flow in tlie network, and (ii) it is cognizant of the user throughput deniands ( T ' ) and of the noncooperative structure of tlieir routing. The first property makes the manager just anotlier user, whose cost function corresponds to tlie system (rather tlian its own) performance. The second property, however, enables the manager to predict the response of the noncooperative users t o any strategy that it chooses, and lieiice to determine a strategy of its own flow tliat would pilot them to a Nash equilibrium that minimizes tlie nianager's cost. Therefore, instead of reacting to the routing strategies of tlie users, the manager fixes this strategy a i d lets tlieiii converge to tlieir respective equilibriuin. This is tlie typical sceimrio of a Stackelberg game [l] in wliicli tlie iiiaiiager plays tlie role of the "leader," and the noiicoo~ierative users play tlie role of the "followers". An optiinal strategy of the leader together with the respective N.asli equi1il)riuiii of tlie followers is a Stackelberg equilibriuira. Tlie presence of sophisticated users that can acquire iiiforiiiatioii about the demands and the cost functions of tlie other users and become Stackelberg leaders, in order to optimize tlieir own performance, is in general undesirable ['J]. However, in tlie problem considered here, the cost functioii of tlie manager is that of the system, and therefore it plays a social, rather than a selfish role.
In this section we investiga.te the optimal strategy of the lender. 111 particular, we address tlie following question: is it possi1)le for the leader to impose a strategy that drives the system into the global optimu~n, i.e., to the point that correspoiids to the solution of a routing problem, in which tlie leader has full control over the entire flow? Intuitively, oiie would expect that the leader cannot enforce the global optiiiiuni, since it controls only part of the flow, while the rest is coiitrolled by noncooperative users. Rather surprisingly, tlie results reported in the sequel show that in most c z e s tlie leader does have such capability. Due to space liiiiits, we coiifiiie ourselves to a general and hrief overview of the results; details can be found in [12].
1. I11 tlie special case of a siiigle follower, the leader can always enforce the global optimum, and we specify its optiiiial strategy.
2.
Iii tlie general case of any (finite) number of followers, tlie leader can enforce the global optimum if and only if its demand is larger than soine specified threshold EO, in wliicli case we specify the leader's optimal strategy.
3.
The threshold co is feasible, in the sense that the total deiiiaiid of tlie followers plus is lower than the total capacity of the network (assuining, of couise, that tlie total demand of followers itself is less than tlie total capacity). Thus, for every set of (fe.zsible) followers, there are feasible leaders that can eiifoice the global optimum.
In heavy loaded networks it is "easy" for tlie leader t o enforce the global optimum (i.e., tlie threshold ro is small).
As the number of users increwes, it I)eco~iies harder for the leader to enforce the global optiniiiiii (i.e., the threshold increases).
The higher the difference in the throiighput deniand of any two followers, tlie easier it becomes for tlie leader to enforce the global optimum.
In the case of an infinite number of followers the leader cannot, in general, enforce the globid optimum. We derive the structure of its optinial strategy a i d an algoritlirri to conipute it.
We point out that the fourtli result above is encouraging, because it is in heavily loaded networks where tlie presence of a manager/leader is particularly important.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we considered design strategies for improving the performance of noncooperative networks. A practical implication of this work is that, design rules for iioncooperative networks may follow the same siinple Imtterns that apply to centrally controlled networks, and limited controllability can be as powerful as full controllability. Our first strategy called for devising proper design rules during the provisioning phase of the network. In addition to being prohibitively complex aut1 hard to imalyze, this problem exhibits, in general, paradoxical behavior, according to which added resources might tlegratle tlie user performance. For a system of parallel links we esta1)lishetl that the addition of capacity guarantees improved perforntaiice for all users. We then showed that tlie capacity allocation problem has a simple and intuitive solution, which assigns the additional capacity exclusively to the liitk with the (initially) highest capacity. It is worth noting tliat, although the noncooperative setting makes tlie analysis complex aid tedious, this solution coincides with the optiiiial capacity allocation when routing is centrally controlled. For general network topologies, we also derived a set of sufficient conditions that guarantee that the Braess Paradox does not occur. The second strategy called for improving tlie performance of the network during its actual operdoii. This can be achieved by a management entity, that has coiitrol on only part of the network flow, and is cogiiizant of tlie presence of noncooperative users. Coiisitleriiig a system of parallel links, we showed that, in a wide riuige of cases, by controlling just a small portion of tlie network flow, the network operating point can be driven iiito tlie glohal 01)-tiinum. This result suggests that, eveii with liiiiited controllability of network flows, proper riui-time actions CiLIi diminish considerably, or eve11 avoid altogether, tlie inefficiency implicated by noncooperative users.
